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IMPLICATIONS OF HOME MONITORING FOR 
THE AGING AMERICAN POPULATION 
JILLISA BRONFMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
The research in this paper will seek to ascertain the extent of 
personal data entry and collection required to enjoy at least the 
minimal promised benefits of distributed intelligence and 
monitoring in the home. Particular attention will be given to the 
abilities and sensitivities of the population most likely to need 
these devices, notably the elderly and disabled. The paper will 
then evaluate whether existing legal limitations on the collection, 
maintenance, and use of such data are applicable to devices 
currently in use in the home environment and whether such 
regulations effectively protect privacy. Finally, given 
appropriate policy parameters, the paper will offer proposals to 
effectuate reasonable and practical privacy-protective solutions 
for developers and consumers. 
INTRODUCTION 
 This article focuses on one subset of the Internet of Things (IoT)1 
revolution, home monitoring technologies.  The use of IoT home 
monitoring technologies especially affects elderly populations using 
these devices and systems in their homes. The selection of these 
technologies is not random; in fact, watching the development of these 
technologies serves as a forecast for the problems inherent in and 
indicative of future use of similar technologies, the “canary in the 
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1 Internet of Things, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries. 
com/us/definition/american_english/Internet-of-things (last visited Nov. 26, 
2015) (defining Internet of Things as the “interconnection via the Internet of 
computing devices embedded in everyday objects, enabling them to send and 
receive data”). 
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coalmine” for the IoT.2 Use of IoT home monitoring technologies for the 
elderly is at this time preliminary as not every household is so equipped. 
While we may see these devices as necessary and desirable for 
vulnerable populations, once they become more available, the use of IoT 
home monitoring devices will become as ubiquitous as other mobile 
devices. Now is the opportune time to evaluate the privacy implications 
of these new technologies, before their intrusions become part of the 
fabric of everyday life. 
 Further highlighting the importance of these new technologies is 
the recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) staff report on IoT, which 
specifically mentions home monitoring technologies. For example: 
[H]ome automation systems that turn on your front porch light 
when you leave work; . . . These are all examples of the Internet of 
Things (“IoT”), an interconnected environment where all manner of 
objects have a digital presence and the ability to communicate with 
other objects and people. The IoT explosion is already around us, in 
the form of . . . connected smoke detectors and light bulbs.3 
 What are the consequences of collecting this data in the home? 
The consequences are of three types: (1) the effect on individual 
behavior and well-being, (2) the effect on corporations and their ability 
to do business in new and unusual ways,4 and (3) the effect on 
                                                
2 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS WORKSHOP 177, at ll. 12–20 
(2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/Internet-
things-privacy-security-connected-world/final_transcript.pdf [hereinafter IOT 
WORKSHOP] (“[T]here can be amazing benefits, but at the same time, there is a 
potential for some serious harm, especially in tele-health and health applications. 
I consider that sort of the canary in the coalmine for the Internet of Things. If 
bad things start happening with tele-health and health applications, you are 
going to see that sort of poison the well, so to speak, for a whole lot of 
additional kinds of connected applications.” (Joseph Lorenzo Hall, the chief 
technologist at the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT))).  
3 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 1 (2015), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-
entitled-Internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [hereinafter IOT CONNECTED 
WORLD]. 
4 Max Chafkin, 41. SamsungInternet, FAST COMPANY: MOST INNOVATIVE 
COMPANIES 2015 (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/3039597/most-
innovative-companies-2015/samsung (“‘Imagine a world in which these [home] 
appliances are connected to each other,’ says David Eun, a Samsung executive 
vice president. ‘What you’d have is one of the largest platforms for distributing 
content and services and apps—even ads.’ . . . [SmartThings is a] “Silicon 
Valley startup [that] offers a kit that makes it easy for consumers control 
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government action. As for the last effect, if the resulting government 
regulation is unable to protect U.S. consumers, other solutions must be 
sought. 
 In evaluating these technologies, we should first consider the 
benefits to consumers. Home monitoring technologies upgrade the 
consumer and the consumer’s home to a higher standard of living at a 
low cost. In the case of monitoring elderly and disabled consumers, the 
cost of a home health care aide may be excessive or prohibitive,5 relative 
to purchasing a small device, even with monthly fees. Thus, because just 
the necessary devices may be purchased, the home monitoring system 
may be more cost-effective as well as more structurally flexible to scale 
up and down based on individual needs for assistance. Further, empirical 
studies have shown that older individuals value home monitoring devices 
because such devices allow them to age in place, among other reasons.6  
Next, we should question the amount of private information 
traded for the use of these new technologies. There is some room for 
individual variance, but there is also a threshold level of information 
required for basic participation. Each user must consider how much 
individual or family information she is willing to upload into the 
thermostat or medical alert device in order for the device to function 
optimally. In many cases, the elderly, and particularly the frail or 
disabled elderly, are willing to downgrade the general expectation of 
privacy in order to receive the benefits of safety and monitoring 
technology in the home.7  
                                                                                                         
Schlage door locks, GE lightbulbs, Sonos sound systems, and, as a result of the 
acquisition, all of Samsung's smart appliances.”).  
5 Based on 44 hours per week by 52 weeks, the annual estimated cost of a health 
care aide is $45,760. Compare Long Term Care Costs Across the United States, 
GENWORTH (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.genworth.com/corporate/about-
genworth/industry-expertise/cost-of-care.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
6 Veerle Claes, et al., Attitudes and Perceptions of Adults of 60 Years and Older 
Towards In-Home Monitoring of the Activities of Daily Living with Contactless 
Sensors: An Explorative Study, 52 INT’L J. OF NURSING STUDIES 134, 134 (2014) 
(“[D]escriptive statistics indicate that adults of 60 years and older find 
contactless monitoring useful for various purposes (e.g. to remain living at home 
longer, safely and independently; for timely detection of emergency situations 
and gradually emerging health problems).”). 
7 See Daphne Townsend, et al., Privacy Versus Autonomy: A Tradeoff Model for 
Smart Home Monitoring Technologies, 33RD ANNUAL INT’L CONFERENCE OF 
THE IEEE-EMBS 4749, 4749 (2011) (“Older adults are willing to trade privacy 
(by accepting a monitoring technology), for autonomy. As the information 
captured by the sensor becomes more intrusive and the infringement on privacy 
increases, sensors are accepted if the loss in privacy is traded for autonomy. 
Even video cameras, the most intrusive sensor type were accepted in exchange 
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 When home monitoring technologies are first used, there may be 
different privacy concerns for different types of collected data. For 
example, data on the temperature of the home may cause less of a 
concern than data on insulin levels. Much of existing law revolves 
around which data is sensitive and which is available for public 
consumption. For now, there is a heightened sensitivity to video capture 
and a lesser willingness to trade video for safety, except in the most 
extreme circumstance – the total obliteration of privacy associated with 
assisted living.8  
There will be less of a distinction in sensitivity of information, 
however, when all of it is combined in a single platform. Indeed, there 
has been an increasing ability of data processors to capture multiple data 
points and either enter them into algorithms or combine them into a 
unified picture of a person. Even seemingly innocuous pieces of 
information may have economic or strategic value under these 
circumstances. Combined and cross-referenced data can fit into a mosaic 
of information that replicates an identity of an individual with increasing 
ease and accuracy. What we think of as autonomous artificial 
intelligence may already be in play, and we are creating it ourselves. 
 Therefore, when we evaluate the exchange of personal data and 
privacy for convenience and access, we will need to look far beyond the 
immediate time and place, and even the present-day user. A simple 
transactional analysis of entering your name, address, or telephone 
number into a single monitoring device is a limited field of study. We 
can peer into the future of home monitoring, which has been explored in 
some detail in science fiction if not legal analysis.  Futurists have offered 
a wealth of analysis, speculation, and science fiction about the dystopian 
eventuality of autonomous devices that begin to think on their own and 
operate on their own. In many cases, the scenarios envision a variety of 
individual electronic elements doing each and both of these activities 
better, faster, and with more or less humanity than humans. In the most 
frighteningly imaginative hypotheticals, the information humans have 
                                                                                                         
for the height of autonomy which is to remain in the home.”).  The author’s 
literature review included articles in which seniors were polled on a wide variety 
of technologies, namely, “[w]earable sensors were predominantly location and 
physiological monitoring. Environmental sensors included switches, stove 
temperature sensors, video and infrared cameras, bed occupancy and bed-based 
heart rate and respiration monitoring. A few focus groups presented implanted 
physiological and location monitoring chips to participants.” Id. at 4750. 
8 See id. at 4750, 4752 (“Video monitoring has a high loss of privacy and a 
moderate gain in autonomy hence it is ranked last. . . . Even video cameras, the 
most intrusive sensor type were accepted in exchange for the height of 
autonomy remaining in the home.”). 
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fed into the machines results in a collective, conscious intelligence that 
surpasses what humans can do or control.  
In this article, we will focus on the realistic aspects of existing 
privacy law as applied to home monitoring technologies, to see what 
works and what falls short. This Introduction has introduced the concept 
of privacy for the relatively new technologies of home monitoring. 
Section I will review the existing law as it applies to these technologies. 
Section II and III will discuss the serious consequences to leaving these 
technologies occasionally and loosely regulated. Section IV will offer 
constructive solutions to bridge the gap between unregulated 
technologies and fully regulated technologies. Lastly, the Conclusion 
will offer remarks and suggestions for future research. 
I. EXISTING PRIVACY LAWS FOR HOME MONITORING DEVICES, 
SERVICES, AND APPLICATIONS 
A. Privacy and Technology, Past and Present 
 Historically, privacy law in the United States has responded to 
technologies that non-physically invade the home and its private sphere, 
seeking to protect the right to be left alone.9 The privacy right at issue for 
home monitoring, however, is the right to control access to personal 
information, and the rights of notice and consent for the distribution of 
such information.10 It is the right not to have data extracted from one’s 
private life, and the right to be free from the abuse of your private data 
                                                
9 See Benjamin Wittes, Databuse: Digital Privacy and the Mosaic, THE 
BROOKINGS INST. 8 (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research 
/papers/2011/04/01-databuse-wittes#_ftnref8 (“The 1890 publication of 
Samuel Warren's and Louis Brandeis's seminal law review article, ‘The 
Right to Privacy,’ and Brandeis's subsequent dissent in the 1928 Supreme 
Court case of Olmstead v. United States—were pivotal in crafting modern 
American attitudes in law, policy, and culture alike towards the concept of 
privacy. . . . The Right to Privacy responded to the invention of the instant 
camera and its use by the press to report on famous people. The Brandeis 
dissent responded to the development of wiretapping technology.”); Samuel 
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1890); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (taking the continuing stand on the issue). 
10 The FTC articulated these basic principles for online privacy in 2000. See 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN 
 THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default 
/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-
marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf. 
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by others. This is a concept one scholar has termed “databuse.”11 Thus, 
we need to move away from legal precedents that consider the home the 
boundary for personal privacy and toward legal frameworks that reflect 
the technologies we have, which allow for access to the home and to 
private information in unprecedented ways. 
 To access the home and its wealth of private and perhaps 
valuable data, home monitoring companies are moving into a sacred 
space. A person’s home is her “castle,”12 and she is the queen of this 
domain and its primary decision-maker. Historically, “the house of 
everyone is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defense 
against injury and violence, as for his repose.”13 It is time to consider 
whether the castle’s threshold, both literally/physically and 
figuratively/legally, can hold back the onslaught of privacy intrusions. 
 Into the early twenty-first century, privacy in the home has been 
given significant judicial deference in evaluating whether a Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure violation has occurred. In Kyllo v. United 
States,14 the Court held that when the government uses a device that is 
not in general public use to explore details of a private home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a Fourth Amendment "search," and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant. Note that Kyllo turns on the uniqueness 
of the government’s access to high technology. But home monitoring 
may at some point become ubiquitous. When this occurs, would listening 
to someone’s home monitoring devices be like looking in an open 
window? Yes, if it is a greenhouse and not the residence per se,15 but no, 
if it is inside the house or on the porch. According to Justice Scalia in 
Florida v. Jardines: “When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the 
home is first among equals . . . This right would be of little practical 
value if the state’s agents could stand in a home’s porch or side garden 
and trawl for evidence with impunity.”16 
 The state’s corresponding obligation to respect the home’s “well-
being, tranquility, and privacy” is an interest “of the highest order in a 
                                                
11 See Wittes, supra note 9 (“The relevant concept is not, in my judgment, 
protecting some elusive positive right of user privacy but, rather, protecting a 
negative right—a right against the unjustified deployment of user data in a 
fashion adverse to the user's interests, a right, we might say, against.”). 
12 The first legal mention of home equals castle is found in Semayne's Case, 77 
ENG. REP. 194 (K.B. 1603).  
13 Id. 
14 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
15 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989). 
16 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). 
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free and civilized society.”17 Now uncontroversial, “Supreme Court 
justices of all stripes today accept that the Fourth Amendment reaches 
beyond the technology of the eighteenth century and requires application 
to today's analogous intrusions.”18 
 Corporate policies, at least on the surface, reflect this legal 
precedent. Nest Labs, maker of home automation devices, headlines a 
section of its privacy policy with “[w]e believe home is a private 
place.”19 Yet, Nest Labs collects and processes many data points through 
its devices,20 with the idea that more data is better.21 More data may not 
                                                
17 Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconsitutional 
Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 INDIANA L.J. 355, 401 (2010) 
(citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).  
18 Wittes, supra note 9. See e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
19 Privacy, NEST (June 17, 2005) https://nest.com/privacy/. 
20 See Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services, NEST (June 17, 2015) 
https://nest.com/legal/privacy-statement/ [hereinafter Nest Privacy Statement] 
(“What information does the Nest Learning Thermostat collect? The Nest 
Learning Thermostat collects: Information input during setup, Environmental 
data from the Nest Learning Thermostat’s sensors, Direct temperature 
adjustments to the device, Heating and cooling usage information, Technical 
information from the device. . . . They can also sense whether something in the 
room is moving. . . . Nest Protect can do things like detect smoke and CO in 
your home, and give you alarms and warnings. For example, if Nest Protect sees 
that smoke or CO levels are rising, it will give you a Heads Up before the 
danger reaches emergency alarm levels and tell you what the danger is.” 
(emphasis added)); Privacy Policy for Nest Web Sites, NEST (June 17, 2015), 
https://nest.com/legal/privacy-policy-for-nest-web-sites (“If you are logged into 
your Nest account, we record the IP address you visit our website from, and if 
you have a Nest device or other connected device, we record adjustments you 
make to the product through the website interface. We store this data along with 
your email address, information about your Nest device, data collected directly 
by the device, a history of your device settings, and any other information we 
have collected about your use of Nest products and services. See our Privacy 
Statement for Nest Products and Services to learn more about the usage 
information collected through our products.”).  
21 See Frequently Asked Questions About Nest Aware with Video History, NEST 
(Jun. 18, 2015), https://nest.com/support/article/Frequently-asked-questions-
about-Nest-Aware-with-Video-History (“Nest Aware is a paid subscription 
service that makes your Nest Cam even better with additional features and 
services. It includes video history, video clips and timelapses, activity zones and 
improved activity alerts.”). The Nest Aware service now saves video for future 
review with video history subscription with up to 30 days saved for review. 
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be better, though, if third-party marketing agencies or government 
entities can access and subpoena that information.22 
 Government entities, however, can access data using less 
transparent and more direct methodologies than the traditional subpoena. 
In this vein, the government has been “piggybacking” on more advanced 
corporate monitoring technologies instead of acting through their own 
technologies.23 Police departments use third-party contractors to access a 
wider variety of surveillance techniques, including cameras, which can 
monitor public streets, and possibly workplaces and homes.24 The 
judicial system must observe this relationship between the government 
and its corporate subcontractors in its interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment and its constitutional companions. 
 
 Additionally, the privacy of personal data has historically been 
protected by relying on contract principles, including the individual’s 
right to notice and the requirement of consent.25 These rights may falter, 
however, if sacrificing privacy means the device saving a life. It should 
be the individual or family, though, who determines how to balance 
privacy and a device’s efficacy.26 
                                                
22 Cf. Nate Cardozo, et al., Who Has Your Back? Elec. Frontier Found. (May 15, 
2014), https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2014 (explaining Nest’s parent 
company, Google, has received six stars, a perfect score, in fighting data 
requests). 
23 See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. 
L.J. 1309, 1311 (2012) (“As the surveillance society expands, the police will 
learn to rely more on the products of private surveillance, and will shift their 
time, energy, and money away from traditional self-help policing, becoming 
passive consumers rather than active producers of surveillance. Private industry 
is destined to become the unwitting research and development arm of the FBI. If 
we continue to interpret the Fourth Amendment as we always have, we will find 
ourselves not only in a surveillance society, but also in a surveillance state.”).  
24 See David Sasaki, SeeChange, DAVIDSASAKI.NAME (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://davidsasaki.name/2014/03/seechange/ (“What did surprise me, what really 
blew my mind, was the off-handed mention that, in addition to NYPD’s own 
3,000 cameras, they also had access to 23,000 streaming cameras placed in 
residential buildings by the private security firm, SecureWatch24.”). 
25 See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, We Can’t Wait: 
Obama Administration Unveils Blueprint for a “Privacy Bill of Rights” to 
Protect Consumers Online (Feb. 23, 2012) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-unveils-blueprint-
privacy-bill-rights (“[C]onsumers have a right to easily understandable 
information about privacy and security practices.”). 
26 See Diane F. Mahoney, et al., In-home Monitoring of Persons with Dementia: 
Ethical Guidelines for Technology Research and Development, 3 ALZHEIMER’S 
& DEMENTIA 217, 220 (2007) (“Both in the home and in the investigator’s 
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B. Regulation 
 Who is monitoring these monitors? The IoT industry is largely 
unregulated, especially when compared to how human in-home health 
care and 911 services are regulated. Regulations for human in-home care 
span health and financial concerns, and 911 service technologies are 
regulated by the FCC.27 By contrast, while government agencies have 
monitored portions of the IoT industry, no one agency has been tasked 
with looking at the ecosystem as a whole to address concerns about 
security or privacy.28 As a result of this patchwork regulation, statutory 
support for consumer privacy in monitoring devices is insufficient. 
Unfortunately, in order to achieve a fully regulated industry, radical 
change is needed.29 
 This is largely because any checks on the industry are market-
driven. The wide-ranging level of staff training within the industry is a 
case in point.30 And while broader health care, financial data, and data 
                                                                                                         
laboratory, the gathering, storage, and retrieval of information from such 
systems must have safeguards built in, to ensure that they meet legal and ethical 
standards. Research protocols should include specific statements about how 
privacy and confidentiality considerations will be handled.”).  
27 Home Care Regulatory Issues, NAT’L ASSOC. FOR HOME CARE & HOSPICE, 
http://www.nahc.org/advocacy-policy/home-care-regulatory-issues/ (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2015); Intrado, the primary provider of 911 service, notes on its 
website that FCC regulations have covered 911, E911, and VoIP technologies. 
FCC E911 Legislation, INTRADO INC., http://www1.911enable.com/resource-
center/fcc-e911-legislation (last visited Dec. 27, 2015). The company’s products 
only extend from enterprise to small and medium businesses, but not to 
consumer use. See Company Overview, INTRADO INC., http://www1.911enable. 
com/about-us/company-overview (last visited Dec. 27, 2015). 
28 See IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 184 (“[N]o regulatory agency was 
looking at the security of these devices. The FCC said, that's not us. The FCC 
looks at the way the radio transmits, not what is being transmitted. And the FDA 
said, it's not us. We look at how the medical part of it works. And it turns out 
that there is this huge gap, that nobody is looking at the security of these devices 
from a cyber security perspective, from a connected device perspective.”). 
29 Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 132 
(2014) (“The FTC’s standard . . . may mean that in the end all biometric and 
sensor-based Internet of Things data need to be treated as [Personally 
Identifiable Information] (PII). That, however, would require a radical re-
working of current law and practice.” (relying upon FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012)). 
30 Compare Medical Alert Questions, LIFESTATION, http://www1.lifestation. 
com/faq.php#q33top10 (last visited Nov. 26, 2015) (“What kind of training do 
LifeStation Care Specialists receive? All LifeStation personnel begin their 
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breach regulations may indirectly touch the industry, those that would 
have any real effect have not yet passed. Thus, regulation is currently not 
only lacking in teeth, it also lacks a “mouth.”31 
 So much of our privacy landscape has been built upon U.S. 
squeamishness about revealing healthcare data. We do have the federal 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 
as amended and supplemented. The privacy rule for HIPAA “establishes 
national standards to protect individuals’ medical records and other 
personal health information and applies to health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and those health care providers that conduct certain 
health care transactions electronically.”32 For home monitoring, the 
subset of data that is medical data might be regulated under HIPAA. 
However, HIPAA applies to some medical data collected from 
consumers but certainly not all. In fact, it skirts much of home 
monitoring entirely, either because the industry does not collect 
applicable data or covered providers are not involved in home 
monitoring.33 Therefore, if the entity gathering health data is not a 
                                                                                                         
education process with formal classroom training followed by mandatory 
examinations at the end of each module. This period is followed by practical 
application training under the guidance of CSAA Certified instructors. 
Following the new hire training process, all personnel are subject to 
performance reviews on a weekly basis for their first 3 months of service. 
Thereafter, all reviews are on a quarterly basis.”) with Kate Rauch, 10 Questions 
to Ask When Shopping for a Personal Emergency Response System (PERS), 
CARING.COM, https://www.caring.com/checklists/personal-emergency-response-
questions (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (“How is the response center staff trained? 
There's no government-regulated PERS staff training or certification 
requirements, so companies train their staff in a variety of ways.”). 
31 For example, the Administration Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights Act of 2015 proclaims that, “[i]t is the sense of Congress that each 
covered entity should provide, when reasonable, a version of the notice required 
under this Act in a format that is computer-readable . . . .” THE WHITE HOUSE, 
ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS 
ACT OF 2015, 1 (proposed Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-
draft.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF 
RIGHTS ACT]. In other words, here’s an idea, if it’s ok with you, you might want 
to consider doing this.  Also, you’ve got 18 months post-data collection to do 
whatever you want with the data collected without fear of civil penalties. Id. at 
18. 
32 The HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/index.html 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2015). 
33 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 179, ll. 16–23 (“And one of the big problems 
here is a lot of consumer-facing health applications aren't governed by HIPAA. 
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covered provider like a hospital or medical care provider, there is no 
protection from HIPAA. 
 United States privacy law also strongly values the individual and 
personal nature of financial information. However, the FTC dismisses 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) as a potential check on the 
unlimited collection and use of data from IoT devices.34 The FTC also 
notes that its own jurisdiction is limited,35 and calls instead for federal 
legislation on privacy and security for the IoT. Nevertheless, the FTC 
promises it will police violations of both “reasonable security” and the 
FCRA in a limited way.36  
 With regard to users who are both elderly and disabled, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires, with some exceptions, 
that “information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of 
the applicant is collected and maintained on separate forms and in 
separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical record[.]”37 
However, this privacy restriction is limited to the employment context. 
Employers are the covered entities for the ADA, and while employers are 
interested in home monitoring of their employees, we still have very few 
home monitoring devices placed in the home by employers. Regulations 
for educational institutions and public places also seem like remote 
connections for home monitoring oversight. Monitoring of employees, 
students, and the public is an important issue of privacy law, but beyond 
the scope of this article. Nevertheless, ADA standards may be useful by 
                                                                                                         
They are not something provided by a covered entity, they are not a PHR, they 
are not a personal health record, so they may not have to deal with the breach 
notification rules. They may at the state level, but not the ones that are now in 
HIPAA via HITECH.” (quoting Joseph Lorenzo Hall of CDT)). 
34 IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at 17 (“[T]he FCRA excludes most 
“first parties” that collect consumer information; thus, it would not generally 
cover IoT device manufacturers that do their own in-house analytics. Nor 
would the FCRA cover companies that collect data directly from consumers’ 
connected devices and then use that data to make in-house credit, insurance, 
or other eligibility decisions – something that could become increasingly 
common as the IoT develops.”). 
35 Id. at viii (“Although the Commission currently has authority to take action 
against some IoT-related practices, it cannot mandate certain basic privacy 
protections – such as privacy disclosures or consumer choice – absent a specific 
showing of deception or unfairness.”). 
36 Id. at 53 (“[We] will continue to look for cases involving companies making 
IoT devices that, among other things, do not maintain reasonable security, make 
misrepresentations about their privacy practices, or violate the requirements of 
the FCRA when they use information for credit, employment, insurance, or 
other eligibility decisions.”).  
37 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (2012).  
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analogy when discussing standards for notice and transparency for 
elderly and disabled users in the solutions section of this article. 
Without a coherent federal data breach strategy, the states have 
stepped in to provide various data breach laws, with varying standards. 
But no state law addresses home monitoring data or IoT data overall, 
protects it, or requires IoT data breach notification.38 
For example, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA),39 the California erasure law, and other age-based statutes may 
serve as useful analogies for developing privacy protections for the aging 
population. But the issues turn on obtaining effective consent from a 
competent individual, and on protecting data that may be collected from 
some individuals based on age. COPPA requires that website operators 
obtain verifiable consent from parents, which is difficult to do because 
parents are often not the actual users.  Similarly, in the context of the 
elderly who have been adjudicated as legally incompetent, or are 
functionally unable to give legal consent despite the lack of such 
adjudication, and are using IoT devices, it would be hard to obtain 
consent from other family members because it is not their data that is 
being collected.  Matters are somewhat complicated by the fact that the 
elderly may be legally and financially able to purchase home monitoring 
devices, unlike children, but may be unable to fully comprehend that data 
is being collected. Additionally, they may not understand the 
consequences of collecting that data.  
 Regulation of home monitoring devices is therefore incomplete 
at best, pending in several jurisdictions on a more general level but not 
specific to IoT devices, and desperately in need of a back-up plan to 
support consumer privacy. At a minimum, if we cannot restrict data 
collection and use from home monitoring devices—although we should 
not abandon this effort—we may be able to restrict after-market use of 
the data for discriminatory purposes. There is a particular need to guard 
against using data gathered from monitoring devices to discriminate 
against populations required to use such devices for life-saving measures. 
Insurers’ use of in-home monitoring device data is the most obvious 
place to begin, which could lead to increased insurance rates based on 
previously undisclosed or even misinterpreted data, but in nearly all 
instances is still seen as invasive.40 Also, IoT data may be subpoenaed in 
                                                
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012). 
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012). 
40 Peppet, supra note 29, at 155–56 (“One can easily imagine health and life 
insurers demanding or seeking access to fitness and health sensor data, or home 
insurers demanding access to home-monitoring system data. As such data 
become more detailed, sensitive, and revealing, states might consider prohibiting 
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cases related to end-of-life and estate decisions made by family members 
and related life insurance companies. Thus, in order to create an 
ecosystem of privacy and security for these devices, we will have to look 
first to the companies themselves. 
C. Industry Standards 
 In the absence of comprehensive regulation, our next hope for 
protecting consumer privacy would be industry standards. In fact, there 
has recently been some movement toward industry standards and the 
establishment of best practices in lieu of government regulation. Industry 
privacy standards for data security include de-identification of personal 
data41 and encryption. The FTC has requested that companies assess and 
test their security measures as well as minimize the data that they 
collect,42 The data minimization standard alone contains several 
recommendations and concerns. For instance, data can be collected later, 
or companies can destroy data no longer in use.43 Although data 
minimization works in theory, it often fails in practice. For example, a 
listening TV picks up everything said in the room, not just “turn on 
TV,”44 and transmits it to the Internet. Data minimization is thus at odds 
with the essence of home monitoring IoT, which is constant monitoring 
and data collection.  
                                                                                                         
insurers from conditioning coverage on their revelation . . . Although such 
information might be useful to a home insurer to investigate a fire or casualty 
claim, it seems invasive to permit insurers to demand such detailed information 
as a condition of insurance.”). 
41 But see Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2010) (“Every successful 
reidentification, even one that reveals seemingly nonsensitive data like movie 
ratings, abets future reidentification.” (quoting Paul Ohm)). 
42 IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at iii (“[C]ompanies should consider: 
(1) conducting a privacy or security risk assessment, (2) minimizing the data 
they collect and retain, and (3) testing their security measures before launching 
their products.”). 
43 IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at iv (“[S]taff’s recommendation on 
data minimization is a flexible one that gives companies many options. They can 
decide not to collect data at all; collect only the fields of data necessary to the 
product or service being offered; collect data that is less sensitive; or de-identify 
the data they collect.”). 
44 Bruce Schneier, Your TV May Be Watching You, CNN (Feb. 12, 2015, 9:16 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/11/opinion/schneier-samsung-tv-listening/ 
(“We need more explicit conversation about the value of being able to speak 
freely in our living rooms without our televisions listening, or having e-mail 
conversations without Google or the government listening. Privacy is a 
prerequisite for free expression, and losing that would be an enormous blow to 
our society.”). 
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Nevertheless, data minimization is crucial given this vastness of 
data collection. When large collections of data aggregate on identifiable 
platforms or within targetable databases, the danger of breach escalates. 
Newly-revised data breach laws in California promise notification post-
breach, but plans for preventing access and breaches remain elusive. 
Further, recommendations for data protection regulations in the United 
States have focused on the collection and storage by large databases.45 
However, smaller providers often collect the information collected by 
home monitoring devices, and any breaches would slip through the gaps 
in these regulations. The next section of this article will evaluate what 
home monitoring device companies are doing to keep their devices and 
systems secure and the data contained in their systems private. 
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY 
A. Security Ecosystems for Home Monitoring Devices 
 Data security is a precondition of privacy protection. The FTC 
met in November 2013 to hear comments on IoT, and issued a staff 
report in January 2015. The commenters focused on three areas of harm 
from security breaches of IoT, including personal information, personal 
safety, and other systems.46 Thus, companies should consider both 
physical security, including locked doors and facilities, and network 
security, including authentication and back-up protocols.  
 There are exponentially more security issues in a distributed 
system vis-à-vis a centralized system such as a single data center. IoT 
presents several additional levels of security issues, from the device to 
the network to the collection or storage of data.47 This is because the 
                                                
45 See Ohm, supra note 23, at 1760; see also THE WHITE HOUSE, THE PERSONAL 
DATA NOTIFICATION & PROTECTION ACT, 2 (proposed Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/updated-
data-breach-notification.pdf (addressing data breach notice requirements for 
“[a]ny business entity engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, that uses, 
accesses, transmits, stores, disposes of or collects sensitive personally 
identifiable information about more than 10,000 individuals during any 12-
month period”). 
46 IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at ii (“[P]articipants noted that the IoT 
presents a variety of potential security risks that could be exploited to harm 
consumers by: (1) enabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal 
information, (2) facilitating attacks on other systems, and (3) creating risks to 
personal safety.”). 
47 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 71–72, ll. 11–25, 1–6 (“[A] couple of quick 
comments on the security issues that are raised by things in the home. I think 
that you have to worry also about the way that the wireless networking exposes 
data to interception. We are wary that industries who are moving into this space 
are not necessarily as mature about the security issues as those as, say, at 
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security of connecting an IoT device to a home network relies on the 
security of the home network itself, which may not be secure at all.48  
 What can go wrong when a home network security is breached? 
First, lax design of security cameras may permit hackers to access live 
feeds and make them available to the Internet. Cameras, the eyes and 
often ears of home monitoring, are used to monitor the security of both 
individuals and property, but may in fact endanger both. The FTC found 
that the online security cameras made by TRENDnet were easily 
hacked.49 The resulting enforcement action against TRENDnet set the 
standard for future FTC prosecutions of home monitoring networks.  
 Second, traditional malware, viruses, and worms can infest a 
home network. Creators of these malware, virus, and worms can either 
incidentally or specifically target50 home monitoring devices. A worm, 
for example, “can be utilized by the attackers to perform distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.”51 A DDoS attack could wipe out an 
entire system, leading to shut down of power, light, or other connected 
systems in the home.  Unfortunately, there is not much in the way of 
financial incentives to build IoT devices with even the most basic 
security envelopes as the devices are usually inexpensive and 
unregulated consumer devices. Similarly, there is no financial incentive 
to upgrade the device with security patches and new versions. Some 
                                                                                                         
Microsoft. The relatively cheap or lower grade devices may lack the computing 
resources or, for economic reasons, there will be less incentive to put good 
security in them. And fourth, that the security perimeter for IoT devices is 
actually rather different because, depending on where the endpoint devices are, 
there may be a higher risk of direct tampering. And there is also a likelihood of 
multiple or changing environments that IoT devices are expected to operate in, 
where they will connect promiscuously, don't necessarily have the ability to 
really know what kind of configuration of what the other device is going to be 
like.” (quoting Lee Tien of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF))). 
48 Id. at 101–04, ll. 6–25, 1–15 (quoting Jeff Hagins, the cofounder and chief 
technology officer at SmartThings, explaining that the security of a whole 
system of IoT is only as strong as the security of home wifi network, and that 
there are defects with the widely used WPS wifi encryption technology).  
49 Id. at 13, ll. 1–6 (“[I]n the FTC's first enforcement foray into the Internet of 
Things, we alleged that TRENDnet's lax software design and testing of its IP-
connected security cameras enabled a hacker to get his hands on the live feeds 
from 700 cameras and make them available on the Internet.”). 
50 E.g., Dick O’Brien, The Internet of Things: New Threats Emerge  
in a Connected World, SYMANTEC (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.symantec. 
com/connect/blogs/internet-things-new-threats-emerge-connected-world (“The 
attacker was in a position to begin attack[ing] these devices at a time of their 
choosing.”).  
51 Id.  
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older hardware even harbors legacy malware such as the “Misfortune 
Cookie.”52 In fact, in most cases, there’s a counterincentive to make the 
security open—e.g. allow a back door53—in order to allow customer 
service fixes and upgrades. Many individuals in the security community 
are familiar with these openings.54 Regulators have begun to notice the 
potential consequences of a breach or of publicly available private data 
being used for unintended purposes.55 
 Finally, the system could simply fail. What happens when the 
system is breached, data is leaked, or the system simply goes offline? 
Doors, windows, and locks may open. Temperature controls may cause 
unsafe low or high temperatures. Any evaluation of the efficacy of a 
home monitoring system must include breach and failure analysis. A 
failsafe mechanism, or default protocol, should be built into the system 
so doors and windows remain secure.56 
 In evaluating home monitoring systems, one must also balance 
security and safety concerns. In many people’s minds, security and safety 
                                                
52 See Robert Vamosi, Attack of the Home Router, DARKMATTERS (May 27, 
2015), http://darkmatters.norsecorp.com/2015/05/27/attack-of-the-home-router/ 
(“Last December, US-CERT at the Department of Homeland Security 
 warned broadband router manufacturers of a common vulnerability, dubbed 
‘“Misfortune Cookie.’” This vulnerability had actually been patched more than 
10 years ago, but was still present on many deployed devices.”). 
53 A list of home router models with backdoors was started at https://github.com 
/elvanderb/TCP-32764/blob/master/README.md (last visited Dec. 27, 2015). 
54 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 74–75, ll. 18–25, 1–10 (“And so I did a talk 
this year at a security conference on breaking cameras, like the ones we have in 
this room. And these devices range from cheap consumer cameras, you know 30 
dollars, 50 dollars, up through 1,000 dollar cameras, 1,000 a piece. And I didn't 
have to do anything special to break into them. They had backdoor accounts left 
on them. They had simple vulnerabilities that anyone in the security community 
who looked at it would be able to break. And it doesn't take a lot of technical 
expertise to do that. And I think the real reason why these exist, why we have 
these problems in embedded devices is there is no financial incentive to 
companies to make their devices secure. The example I always throw out is, 
when is the last time you saw a bad review on Amazon because some product 
had a security vulnerability? Never.” (quoting Craig Heffner, security researcher 
with Tactical Network Solutions)). 
55 See id., at 12–13, ll. 25, 1–6. Regulatory scrutiny started with the FTC’s 
TRENDnet's investigation but is unlikely to end there. 
56 Id. at 348–49, ll. 19–25, 1 (“[A]t that point, the design should take into 
account what happens when the service does get shut down or when the Internet 
is unavailable. If the Internet is unavailable, you shouldn't be locked out of your 
house. Consequently, if the Internet is unavailable, your lock shouldn't fail [to] 
open, and therefore people would be able to walk into your house.” (quoting 
Marc Rogers, Principal Security Researcher at Lookout, Inc.)). 
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are synonymous. However, if a home monitoring system contains two-
factor authentication to access the system, there is a delay in uploading 
data to the system, which may decrease the level of safety in, for 
example, an emergency response system. The risk of security leaks is not 
just that privacy may be compromised, but that life and limb are in 
danger. Emergency personnel responding to medical emergencies may 
be delayed in their arrival at the home.  
B. Security in the Home and Homeland Security 
 Increasingly, security in the home is the foundation for national 
security. Looking to hack devices connected from people’s homes to the 
Internet? Searches can be performed online,57 to find networked home 
devices to hack, and can be done by anyone, including those with 
commercial or political motives. Access to any one device can allow 
access to an entire networked system, particularly when the device has 
no password or security mechanism of its own. When hackers from 
outside the United States reach home networks, they may find easier 
access to personal data than they have in the past through the portals 
established by government entities or large commercial operations in the 
United States. Therefore, security begins at home, and in the home. 
 Indeed, there is a pending threat of cyberterrorism against home 
monitoring systems if national security is dependent on the passwords 
consumers enter into their home networks. “Passwords are the ‘keys to 
the castle’ for important parts of our lives online,” yet they are often a 
weak link in the security of home networks.58 In addition to data 
collected by devices connected to the Internet, consumers are voluntarily 
entering much of the private data collected by the home monitoring 
devices, including entering their names, addresses, personal contacts, 
medical information and other personal data in order to sign up for 
services and activate the devices. One example would be in naming the 
devices, or the sets of data, including using consumers’ and their 
children’s names.59  
                                                
57 See SHODAN, http://www.shodan.io (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (“Shodan is 
the world's first search engine for Internet-connected devices.”). 
58 See Joseph Lorenzo Hall, The Beginning of the End of Passwords, CENTER 
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Oct. 21, 2014), https://cdt.org/blog/the-beginning-
of-the-end-of-passwords/ (last visited Dec 27, 2015) (“For something so 
important, passwords have long been a poor fit: they are frequently stolen in 
massive quantities, written down on post-it notes attached to the computers 
they’re supposed to protect (please don’t do that!), and people choose passwords 
that are way, way too simple (e.g., “password”).”). 
59 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 88–89, ll. 17–25, 1–3 (“[T]he consumers 
actually add contextual data into the systems. So with our system as an example, 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW   209 
 
 Access to home monitoring devices can have devastating 
consequences if left available for hacking and other malfeasance.60 As of 
2014, hackers who were able to access Nest Labs devices did so with 
physical, in-person access to the devices, rather than remotely.61 But the 
possibility of remote and system-wide hacking remains, and is perhaps 
imminent. The potential for cyberterrorism squeaks in at the home-based 
level in a way few anticipate when they purchase a thermostat or other 
home monitoring device. Marc Rogers, the Principal Security Researcher 
at Lookout, Inc., a mobile security company, has speculated that, “a 
connected thermostat is something of a device that can provide intel of 
what's going on inside your house, when your house is empty and, if 
harnessed into a large community of things, can even be used as a 
weapon to attack critical infrastructure.”62 Homeland security may have 
stronger passwords, but the federal government may fail to realize its 
citizens’ security is dependent on this fundamental weakness in home 
security.  
 Easy access to home monitoring data is not all bad, however. 
The United States government may want to access home monitoring data 
to monitor its own citizens to avoid cyberterrorism, and to protect against 
threats from inside and outside the country. Governments may be 
interested in accessing the individual data collected by home monitoring 
devices, transforming it into collective big data, and using it to protect 
entire cities and states. The use of near real-time analytics of this data go 
beyond alerting paramedics about individual emergencies, such as a 
                                                                                                         
consumers get to group devices by room, for example. And so you can tell at my 
house, by looking at the data that we have in our system, right, I have my 
daughters' rooms. And what are they named? My daughters' names, right? 
Caitlin's room and Claire's room, et cetera, right? And there are motion sensors 
in those rooms. So access to that data would tell you my childrens' names and 
whether they are in their room or not. It's very, very private information.” 
(quoting Jeff Hagins of SmartThings)). 
60 Id. at 105, ll. 5–16 (“[C]onnected lightbulbs tend to have no security 
whatsoever, but the connected door lock tends to have more security, right? 
Because the manufacturer doesn't perceive, and rightly so, that the lightbulb 
should be secure. And so they put a lot more energy into securing the doorlock 
than they do the lightbulb. And the question becomes whether that is -- is that an 
okay thing from a consumer perspective, right, that somebody can drive along in 
front of my house and hijack my lights, right? Which is completely doable.” 
(quoting Jeff Hagins of SmartThings)). 
61 Lily Hay Newman, Pretty Much Every Smart Home Device You Can Think of 
Has Been Hacked, SLATE (Dec. 30, 2014, 4:38 PM), http://www.slate.com 
/blogs/future_tense/2014/12/30/the_Internet_of_things_is_a_long_way_from_be
ing_secure.html (listing IoT devices that have been hacked, and how). 
62 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 304, ll. 17–22. 
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pending strokes, to alerting city services about group emergencies, such 
as potential heat stroke due to a power failure.63   
Nevertheless, government access may be troublesome. As noted 
by Lee Tien from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, in comments for 
the FTC IoT workshop in 2013, “[although] we are not discussing 
government surveillance today, . . . anyone who thinks about the privacy 
issues thoughtfully, is going to have an eye on what data about 
household activities or personal activities the government could end up 
obtaining, either directly from the devices or from IoT providers, 
whether using legal process or other less savory means.”64  
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ADVERTISING AND OTHER THIRD-PARTY 
USES  
A. Advertising and Marketing Private Home Monitoring Data 
 While security issues establish the foundation for consumer 
privacy, there are several unique privacy issues associated with access to 
consumer data by home monitoring device companies and their 
subcontractors. For example, advertising and marketing companies are 
keen to access personal data in the home in a way previously 
unimagined. Third-party distribution of home monitoring data is likely to 
result in targeted advertising by these companies.65 Connected 
thermostats tell advertising companies who is home, and when, based on 
pre-programmed temperatures for the home. This information can be 
used to send ads, via the home monitoring devices or other media, to 
consumers in the home. 
 The most pervasive home monitoring may be in the form of 
entertainment devices such as televisions. Smart televisions and gaming 
consoles collect consumer data from the users for the purposes of 
establishing an account. They also collect data at myriad data points 
during television viewing and game play. In particular, there are newer, 
emotive interfaces for voice and gestural input that collect “personal” 
                                                
63 See Erin Bush, FAQs About Neustar and Our Assistance to Law Enforcement, 
NEUSTAR BLOG (July 17, 2012), https://www.neustar.biz/blog/faq-neustar-
assistance-law-enforcement (noting the government’s longstanding relationship 
with Neustar, a real-time information analytics company).    
64 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 68, ll. 10–18. 
65 Id. at 364, ll. 9–15 (“Now again, I'm not saying this is happening today, but it 
would surprise me if we had this entire multi-billion, you know, enumerated 
Internet of Things and no effort were made for your refrigerator to maybe 
suggest that you should get some ice cream with the milk that you've just run out 
of.” (quoting Ryan Calo of the University of Washington Law School)). 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW   211 
 
data beyond that directly entered into the screen.66 This data can go 
beyond what the thermostat does to send data about who is home and 
when. This data will tell advertisers who is lonely, who is hungry, and, of 
course, who is interested in the shopping channels. The key issue here is 
that this information may be transmitted to third parties without notice. 
For example, Cnet noted in February 2015, that “Samsung's Smart TV 
privacy policy… warns that customers should ‘be aware that if your 
spoken words include personal or other sensitive information, that 
information will be among the data captured and transmitted to a third 
party through your use of Voice Recognition.”67  
 In the near future, smart home appliances and monitoring 
devices will become more like computers. Consumers may view home 
appliances as designed for the historical purpose, but engineers “view a 
refrigerator really as a 72 inch computer . . . that just happens to keep 
your food cold.”68  Each and every connected device captures vast 
quantities of data, and it is either used by the companies collecting the 
data, uploaded to the Internet, or both. Video cameras and video capture 
devices, in particular, collect such significant quantities of data that 
camera companies are enthusiastic about using the data in new and 
interesting ways.69 
                                                
66 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 86, ll. 12–22 (“But these gaming 
technologies are ushering in a tremendous amount of sensory collection and 
capture in the living room, right? Between voice commands and machines that 
are active that are able to listen and detect whether or not particular words are 
being stated in the room. They contain biometric technology, so they can do 
some level of face recognition and other kind of avatar recognition for 
personality. This is, I think, one of the most interesting factors for bringing this 
kind of connectivity and technology into the home.” (quoting Lee Tien of EFF)). 
67 Dan Graziano, Disable this Feature to Stop Your Samsung Smart TV from 
Listening to You, CNET (Feb. 10, 2015, 3:34 PM), http://www.cnet.com/how-
to/samsung-smart-tv-spying/. 
68 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 59, ll. 4–6. 
69 Jared Newman, The Future of Consumer Tech is About Making You 
 Forget It’s There, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 27, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3042948/sector-forecasting/the-future-of-
consumer-tech-is-about-making-you-forget-its-there (“‘It's really important to 
not think of video and photo capture as an independent thing to do on the 
device,’ Prober says. ‘It's really, “What do you do with the content when it's 
captured?”’ . . . That question will become even more important as new tools 
like 360-degree cameras become available. Suddenly, you have a lot more 
footage to work with, which means cameras will need to get smarter at helping 
you tell the best story.” (quoting CJ Prober, GoPro's senior vice president of 
software and services)).  
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 Granted, smart appliances are alluring. For example, a consumer 
using these appliances does not need to expend energy ensuring her room 
remains at a comfortable temperature. Wink, Nest, and Personal 
Emergency Response Systems (PERS) all rely on this essential 
transaction: enter some personal data, a little or a lot, very private or not 
so private, and you will see a fruitful and possibly instantaneous return 
on your investment. The needle will move on your valuable personal 
comfort – you will feel the warmth of connection, of safety, or of the air 
in the room. The smarter a consumer wants the device to be, the more 
she must feed it with her identity or personal information. 
 Indeed, the quantity of data created by even a small subset of 
home monitoring devices connected to the Internet is enormous.70 To 
compile the data, at this point there are more devices communicating 
with the network than individuals communicating with the network, and 
the number of connected devices is increasing rapidly.71 The number of 
devices connected to the Internet has been facilitated by the move from 
IP v4 to IP v6 and the consequential greater capacity for IP addresses72 to 
associate with each device. Further, the ability not only to capture large 
quantities of data but also to process such data in real time73 compounds 
the need to address privacy concerns at this juncture. 
                                                
70 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 89, ll. 3–10, 14–22 (“We have less than 
10,000 households today, so we are a startup. We just started selling actively at 
the end of August. Less than 10,000 households using our product, we generate 
150 million discrete data points a day out of those 10,000 households. It's an 
enormous amount of data, most of which would put everybody to sleep . . . Most 
of the data is not meaningful or useful to anyone, and yet, as I've said, there's a 
lot of — you can get the entire context of my home. Who is home, what rooms 
are occupied, the comings and goings of the family. There is an enormous 
amount of data coming out the house that has to be protected. And certainly I'm 
at the forefront of this as an industry, but as a consumer, I get very concerned 
about that data.” (quoting Jeff Hagins of SmartThings)). 
71 Id. at 7, ll. 10–23 (“Five years ago, for the first time, more things than people 
connected to the Internet. By 2020, an estimated 90 percent of consumer cars 
will have some sort of vehicle platform, up from 10 percent today. And it is 
estimated that, by 2015, there will be 25 billion things hooked up to the Internet. 
By 2020, we are told the number will rise to 50 billion  . . . [including the 
capacity to] help us remotely monitor an aging family member . . . .”(quoting 
Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman of the FTC)). 
72 Id. at 142, ll. 20–23 (“[I]n February of 2011, we ran out of the IP version 4 
32-bit address space, so we standardized in 1996 an IP version 6 128-bit address 
space.” (quoting Vint Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist for 
Google)). 
73 WHITE HOUSE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT, BIG DATA: SEIZING 
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 2 (Feb. 2015), https://www 
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20150204_Big_Data_Seizing_Opportun
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 This increased capacity to transmit data means that more data 
will be collected and stored from a larger variety of devices. With the 
increase in the types of data collection devices, this enhanced capacity 
will result in vast databases filled with personal information. To the 
extent each new home monitoring technology is added to a platform of 
connected devices, the incremental creep of additional devices and the 
barely perceptible change in privacy depletion may not be noticeable or 
quantifiable. A consumer might say, “I have a television remote and a 
mobile phone and it is the same technology,” generating some 
enthusiasm for Apple brand iWatches.74 Watches, in particular, are a 
familiar mode of technology interaction for older generations of 
individuals, and may therefore be particularly effective in gently 
reminding the elderly user to take pills and eat, in addition to serving as 
an alert device for falls and other in-home emergencies.75 But the more 
data available, the more industry will step up to use this data for positive 
aspects (individual and collective safety), negative ones (surveillance, 
hacking), and uses that can go either way (hyper-targeted marketing, 
insurance design). 
 Home monitoring data may indeed be used for positive social 
purposes. Initially, advertisers could collect home monitoring data 
related to door locks to see who might be interested in insurance or alarm 
systems. Then neighborhood watch organizations could use individual 
home monitoring data collected by marketing databases for alerts. 
Additionally, the FTC touts the wonderful benefits to energy 
conservation if, “[i]n the home, for example, smart meters can enable 
energy providers to analyze consumer energy use and identify issues 
with home appliances, ‘even alerting homeowners if their insulation 
seems inadequate compared to that of their neighbors,’ thus empowering 
                                                                                                         
ities_Preserving_Values_Memo.pdf (“[D]ata analysis is increasingly conducted 
in speeds approaching real time.”). 
74 John Melloy, Apple May Sell 1 Billion ‘Life-Saving’ Watches, CNBC (Mar. 9, 
2015, 1:31 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102488957?__source=xfinity|mod&par=xfinity 
(Explaining that during the final stages of the initial draft of this paper, Apple 
released the Apple iWatch, widely touted as a “life saving device.”). Query 
whether wearable self-monitoring devices will replace home monitoring systems 
entirely or merely interact with them. 
75 Lively 24/7 Emergency Medical Alert System, LIVE!Y, http://www.mylively. 
com/how-it-works (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (“Simply plug the Lively hub into 
a power outlet—it just starts working. Then place activity sensors around the 
home, activate the account online and start wearing the watch. No home Internet 
connection or phone line is required. It’s that simple . . . The clip and monthly 
auto fall-detection monitoring service will be available in late 2015 for a 
nominal additional charge.”). 
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consumers to ‘make better decisions about how they use electricity.”76 
Comparative data is used to show whether one’s home is using more or 
less electricity than the neighborhood or city average.  
But it doesn’t take a vivid imagination to wonder what other data 
may be shared with the neighbors. IoT devices collect a much greater 
quality and quantity of data; a standard model of notice and consent for 
use may not be able to encompass the potential uses and misuses of this 
data.77 
B. Notice and Consent for Marketing Use 
 Standard notice and consent requirements are over-inclusive in 
the sense that they ask for notice and consent where the consumer may 
not necessarily be interested. For example, a home monitoring consumer 
may only use the camera function for video, but not audio. As a result of 
the lengthy and possibly irrelevant language in privacy policies, few 
consumers read notices and fewer read them thoroughly.  
More importantly, the policies may also be under-inclusive in the 
sense that they notify consumers that data will be collected without fully 
fleshing out the types of data that will be collected, or how the data will 
be used.78 Familiar technologies, such as a camera, may be used to collect 
data in unfamiliar ways. Nest’s Dropcam camera collects environmental 
data as follows: “We collect data from several sensors built into Nest 
Cam. These sensors collect data such as camera temperature and ambient 
light in the room. By recording this information, Nest Cam can know, for 
instance, whether it’s dark and it should turn on night vision . . . . We 
may process information from your camera so that we can send you 
alerts when something happens.”79 This is arguably beyond a camera’s 
obvious purpose of simply recording what it sees, and may lead to a host 
of “surprise” uses of the data yet to be imagined. 
 The way information is gathered on devices present additional 
challenges to the notice and consent model. The information is provided 
as a continuous flow rather than provided in bursts of information or with 
                                                
76 IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at 8 (citations omitted). 
77 See Section III.C infra for further discussion of imaginable misuses. 
78 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 322, ll. 14-22 (“The other thing is also to 
make sure the consumer understands what data is being collected. It's one thing 
to say that data is being collected, but it's another thing to say that actually we 
are collecting your telephone number, we are collecting your birthdate, we are 
collecting your sex. You have to be very clear about it so that they can 
understand what the implications of that data being shared are.” (quoting Marc 
Rogers of Lookout, Inc.)). 
79 Nest Privacy Statement, supra note 20.  
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a digital transmission by the consumer.80 When this information is 
provided continuously, there are fewer opportunities for user interface 
and input, and therefore fewer opportunities to interact with the 
consumers and obtain consent for use of their data. Small consumer 
devices such as smart light bulbs may have no screens for user interface. 
Devices may be updated by the system automatically without user notice 
and consent. The window of opportunity for notice and consent may be 
lost for short-term use of disposable products that create a long trail of 
data and fill the databases with personal information. 
 There’s a significant logistical effort involved in notices for 
home monitoring devices as well. Notice has at least two triggers in the 
home monitoring application. One, can any reasonably simple and 
understandable notice cover what the data is actually used for?81 And 
two, how do we provide notice when there’s no user interface on the 
device?82 The FTC is aware of this issue and cautions, “[s]taff 
acknowledges the practical difficulty of providing choice when there is 
no consumer interface and recognizes that there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach. Some options include developing video tutorials, affixing QR 
codes on devices, and providing choices at point of sale, within set-up 
wizards, or in a privacy dashboard.”83 Particular attention will be needed 
                                                
80 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 123, ll. 6–13 (“This notion of continuous 
monitoring, which came up very briefly in the panel discussion, is important for 
several reasons, not the least of which that continuously monitoring things tells 
you about the processes in a much more refined way then if you showed up at 
the doctor once every six months or once every three months or only when 
you're sick.” (quoting Vint Cerf of Google)). 
81 Id. at 98–99, ll. 21–25, 1–8 ( “Whereas there are so many examples today of 
cases where information is getting shared, like how many people have pushed 
the button to say "okay" on a notice from your phone that says such-and-such 
application wants access to your location. And you say, okay. Well, what's it 
doing with that information, right? And does it mean that the phone is just 
accessing the location, that the application is only accessing the location local to 
the phone or is it accessing that location information and shipping it off 
somewhere? And the answer is, you don't know. But you've said okay.” (quoting 
Jeff Hagins of SmartThings)). 
82 Id. at 99, ll. 12–25 (“And that's assuming, you know, that the device even has 
any kind of an interface for the user, right? Many of the devices -- I think many 
of the devices we would be looking at, especially with smaller ones, I mean, we 
already have display problems even with the machine that is designed to show 
you all sorts of things. The idea that anyone would -- you can't do 80 screens, it 
doesn't make sense. And if it is an alarm clock, that is not actually going to be 
providing any sort of direct notice. You know, the entire sort of notice and 
choice aspect of Fair Information Practices has a real breakdown with a lot of 
these kinds of built-in devices.” (quoting Lee Tien of EFF)).  
83 IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 3, at v. 
216 WEATHERING THE NEST              [Vol. 14 
to address the needs of the older populations in their willingness to use 
certain technologies for notice and consent, and ADA-like access for 
elderly disabled consumers should be embedded in each of these possible 
alternatives to text notices. Additionally, user interface notice and 
consent procedures may have to be re-formulated to encompass notice on 
multiple platforms: app, device, smartphone, console, laptop, etc. 
 Not all privacy policies and terms of use address third party use 
of information. If they do, the terms of the notice and consent may be 
broad enough to encompass some rather socially abhorrent practices. As 
a consequence, marketers may make use of personal data as described 
herein, and without restriction. In addition, there is the specter of concern 
about use of third party data for insurance purposes. Insurers would be 
eager to gather personal data in the home either ostensibly by an insurer 
providing the device and collecting the data, or by the insurer 
“piggybacking” on existing data. In addition to concerns about 
blacklisting certain customers, or redlining certain neighborhoods, the 
insurer might make the disclosure of such data a precondition to 
obtaining insurance or obtaining a lower rate for existing service.84 In 
early 2015, an insurer offered customers exactly that deal.85 It is difficult, 
given the United States legal framework of contract law inclusive of 
notice and consent, to argue that these uses of personal data are “illegal” 
or beyond the scope of the implied contract. Assuming notice was given 
properly and consent was obtained within the context of U.S. contract 
law, the use has been considered fair. 
 Consumers, especially older or burdened consumers, may want 
to read a privacy notice for a single device or website, or perhaps even a 
few, but when home monitoring devices become embedded in nearly 
every household appliance, consumers are unlikely to read and consent 
effectively to each privacy notice. Furthermore, home monitoring 
presents different challenges for notice of collection for able-bodied 
individuals and for senior/disabled product offerings. In order to 
calculate a cost-benefit ratio for consent for the adoption of IoT devices 
in the home, society must look at the benefits of such devices. One of the 
                                                
84 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 211, ll. 14–22 (“[Y]ou could start to see a 
home insurer, for example -- I mean, I love the General Electric example this 
morning of leaving your -- you know, your stove telling you you are leaving 
your stove on. Well, I'm pretty sure my home insurer would love to know that, if 
I was routinely doing that. Could they, as a condition of my insurance, require 
me to have my appliances share that information with them?” (quoting Scott 
Peppet, a professor at the University of Colorado Law School)).  
85 Jose Pagliery, Would You Wear a Tracker to Get an Insurance 
 Discount?, CNN (Apr. 8, 2015, 5:23 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04 
/08/technology/security/insurance-data-tracking/. 
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primary benefits is automation of data collection and upload, i.e. that the 
consumer does not need to manually transmit the information.  
 The differentials for consent include impaired consent or family 
consent for patient, authentication and identification problems, and data 
retention lifespan issues. How can we ascertain notice and consent for an 
elderly patient on the Alzheimer’s spectrum or in the early stages of 
dementia? Obtaining effective consent from an elderly patient would fall 
under the auspices of elder law rather than privacy law, once notice is 
given. If someone other than the user has purchased a system for a 
disabled patient, who is the user for authentication and access purposes? 
Likewise, the notice might have to switch from the data collection 
subject to the purchaser/user depending on the capacity to consent issues 
raised by elder law and disability law. Data retention presents a 
somewhat lesser burden for the elderly than for students, who are fully in 
possession of many of the rights and responsibilities of adults but have 
also the right to be forgotten under erasure laws for those under 18 years 
old. 
 The FTC has tried to minimize the burden of endless notices by 
limiting them to unexpected uses, with the following guidance: “For uses 
that would be inconsistent with the context of the interaction (i.e., 
unexpected), companies should offer clear and conspicuous choices.”86 
Conversely, the latest bill proposed by the current administration 
proposes that if the use is exactly what the customer asked for, 
companies may presume notice and consent.87  
C. Imagined Harms for Unimagined Uses 
 IoT home monitoring devices designed to save lives or at least 
improve comfort may collect data beyond what is necessary to provide 
the service. As the technology expands beyond use by the elderly and 
disabled users to the broader population, this very personal in-home 
collection of data may be used for financial gain by third parties. 
  There are concerns that only rich individuals and families will 
benefit from home monitoring. Perhaps, conversely, the poor may be 
monitored more intensely, either through “voluntary” economic 
incentives or individual necessity.88 There is very little regulatory 
                                                
86 Id. at vi. 
87 WHITE HOUSE DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT, supra note 
31, at 8 (“Personal data processing that fulfills an individual’s request shall be 
presumed to be reasonable in light of context.”). 
88 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 212, ll. 8–12 (“I'm not sure this is really a 
problem of an economic divide, like the poor aren't going to be able to get 
enough sensors. I think the poor are likely to have sensors imposed on them, far 
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prohibition of economic discrimination based on the collection of data 
through home monitoring devices, as long as it is accurate.89 Although 
elderly and disabled users may, in theory, fall on either side of this 
economic spectrum, they should be considered among those particularly 
vulnerable to unimagined uses of their data. The elderly are vulnerable 
because of their unfamiliarity with new technologies, and the disabled 
are vulnerable because of their difficulty in using the technologies. These 
concerns are amplified by the necessity of these technologies in the lives 
of both the elderly and disabled. 
 A new bill proposes to address this issue of “disparate impact” 
resulting from data analysis and targeted use.90 It remains to be seen, 
however, whether simply raising or even proscribing this issue will 
eliminate this sort of data analysis. There are “black box” algorithms, 
designated trade secrets by the data analysis and advertising companies, 
which protect advertisers’ rights to withhold information needed to 
correctly police this issue.91 
 It may be premature to declare an absolute harm from 
unimagined uses. Perhaps consumers would like to be delighted and 
surprised by new uses and see them as improvements to the quality of 
their lives. How should we measure this and obtain informed consent? A 
“surprise me” check box option would capture the high-risk tolerance 
population, but without further specification, few would choose this 
                                                                                                         
more than everybody else.” (quoting Scott Peppet of University of Colorado 
Law School)). 
89 Peppet, supra note 29, at 128 (“[T]he FCRA is designed to ensure accuracy in 
credit reports . . . Accuracy, however, is really not the problem with Internet of 
Things sensor data. One’s Fitbit, driving, or smart home sensor data are 
inherently accurate—there is little to challenge. What is more questionable are 
the inferences drawn from such data . . . Thus, the FCRA provides consumers 
with little remedy if Internet of Things data were to be incorporated into credit-
reporting processes.”). 
90 WHITE HOUSE DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT, supra note 
31, at 9 (“Disparate Impact.—When analyzing personal data in a manner that is 
not reasonable in light of context and results in adverse actions concerning 
multiple individuals, a covered entity shall—Conduct a disparate impact 
analysis to determine whether the analysis of personal data described in 
subsection (d) results in a disparate impact on individuals on the basis of age, 
race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, or 
national origin.").  
91 Our Data, Our Rules?, THE BRIAN LEHRER SHOW (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/our-data-our-rules/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) 
(Frank Pasquale, professor of law at U. Maryland, discussing his book, Blackbox 
Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information, available 
at http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674368279). 
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option.  A company could offer proposed future uses in the notice, but 
these may not be sufficiently definite to be construed as legally-
enforceable contracts. So far, privacy notices have not been held to a 
contract standard.92 Further, devices with multiple sensors in the home 
can be combined to create new and highly intricate portraits of 
individuals.93 In that sense, nearly every use is a surprise, or an 
unintended use, because it can be combined with other data and/or 
transferred to third parties via bankruptcy, merger, or acquisition. 
 Yet again, the collection and analysis of data may have a positive 
effect on the individual generating the data. For example, normalization 
of the individual’s data may occur. This happens when data is 
streamlined to yield a “normal” value representing the individual’s 
comfort zone, used by the system as a default. The effect will be 
immediate when an aberrant temperature in the home creates an alert that 
causes the home’s resident to change or normalize the temperature, either 
through manual adjustment or through a preset, programmed response.  
 Privacy is always an individual calculation. Privacy is still 
important to older users of home monitoring devices, but the calculation 
may result in a different decision. For elderly users, the ability to be 
identified and located is an important value if the purpose is to get 
immediate attention. Individually worn healthcare devices can identify 
individuals with great certainty.94 Wearable devices are luxurious rather 
than necessary for functioning in society, unless they are fall alerts 
connected to a home monitoring service, which become nearly a 
necessity for a fragile, elderly individual. In the future, geo-location and 
identification devices may become functionally or literally invaluable as 
they become the foundation for receiving emergency medical care. 
Vulnerable consumers may welcome this development, or may choose 
                                                
92 See Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 
2004); Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common 
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUMBIA L. REV. 583, 595–97 (2014) (finding that 
privacy policies, unlike terms-of-use documents, are typically perceived as non-
contractual in nature). 
93 Peppet, supra note 29, at 93 (citation omitted) (“Just as two eyes generate 
depth of field that neither eye alone can perceive, two Internet of Things sensors 
may reveal unexpected inferences. For example, a fitness monitor’s separate 
measurements of heart rate and respiration can in combination reveal not only a 
user’s exercise routine, but also cocaine, heroin, tobacco, and alcohol use, each 
of which produces unique biometric signatures. Sensor fusion means that on the 
Internet of Things, ‘every thing may reveal everything.’”). 
94 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 170–71, ll. 24–25, 1–2 (“Ira Hunt, who is the 
CIO of the CIA said you can be 100 percent identified, as an individual, by your 
Fitbit data. Why? Because no two persons' gaits or ways of moving are the 
same.” (quoting Scott Peppet of University of Colorado Law School)). 
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lower-tech options that may be more expensive and/or less supportive of 
their needs in order to protect their privacy in a largely unregulated field. 
 In fact, consumers may not be fully aware of privacy and 
security flaws or be able to fix them even if their awareness of such 
issues is fully developed.95 The FTC, and indeed the entire U.S. 
government, takes a stance on the issue of privacy and security that relies 
on the assumption that educating the consumer will solve every flaw in 
the system. The solution may be to make consumers aware of the issue, 
but also to rely on developers to close the security gaps.96 Developers can 
close the gaps by adding privacy by design methodologies to product 
design. The following section evaluates the efficacy of this hybrid 
solution. 
IV. POTENTIAL PRIVACY SOLUTIONS FOR HOME MONITORING 
DEVICES, SERVICES, AND APPLICATIONS 
A. Waiting for Developer Knights in Shining Armor 
 Developers have the ability to take constructive action before 
products hit the market to prevent privacy violations and security 
breaches. The process begins with quality assurance principles and 
security by design. Security is a necessary precondition to privacy, and it 
can be baked into home monitoring devices. There is value in 
preconditioning home monitoring appliances to prevent both use outside 
of acceptable parameters for the device and hacking.97 Technical 
                                                
95 Id. at 77, ll. 4–17 (“Unfortunately, I don't think that trying to educate users 
will get us where we need to be. You know, the mantra for years in computer 
security has been educate the user, educate the user. Well, guess what? We've 
had security problems for decades. That clearly isn't working. Users don't 
understand the technologies they are dealing with. I hear the term, people always 
say, people are so technologically — you know, they understand all this 
technology. No, they don't. They have a phone with pictures on it and they point 
at the pictures. That is not understanding technology. My 1-year-old can unlock 
my phone. She has no idea what technology even means.” (quoting Craig 
Heffner of Tactical Network Solutions)). 
96 Id. at 77, ll. 18–21 (“So I think we really need to push vendors towards 
security as these embedded systems come out and become more prevalent and, 
in reality, they already are.” (quoting Craig Heffner of Tactical Network 
Solutions)). 
97 Id. at 106, ll. 10–17 (“So you can't set your range to 1,000 degrees. Somebody 
can't set your refrigerator to 90 degrees and have all your food go bad and the 
milk spoil. They only work within reasonable parameters that a consumer might 
use the product for. So you can build that software into the devices themselves, 
which further adds to the security and the safety in the system.” (quoting Mike 
Beyerle of GE Appliances)). 
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standards for secure design are available online and updated frequently.98 
As a foundational matter, universities must educate developers to design 
products that are not only beautiful and clever, but also secure.99 
Companies should also hire engineers with security knowledge and 
experience (not just generic software developers) to design and maintain 
these programs.   
 In theory, consumers would only buy secure products that will 
protect their privacy. In reality, market information on this subject is 
scant and unreliable. Worse yet, there will always be certain consumers 
who choose to buy less secure devices because they prefer cheaper or 
trendier products. Therefore, designers of secure IoT solutions for the 
home should evaluate the scalability of solutions up to network level and 
down to consumer level. While securing data privacy may not be at the 
forefront of a device engineer’s concerns,100 it should at least be on her 
checklist. 
 For consumer-friendly options, designers and developers could 
look to ADA standards for access to digital media, including mobile 
devices. Microsoft has taken the initiative in this regard by not only 
creating accessible options baked into its offerings, but also developing 
instructional videos explaining how to use these options and posting 
them on YouTube.101 Both developers and consumers can access and use 
accessibility options to allow users with sensory disabilities to effectively 
use the service. In the case of IoT devices, notices for privacy may lean 
on these for platforms that support IoT devices, or use these 
methodologies as guidance for direct device use. 
                                                
98 See Standards for M2M and the Internet of Things, Published Specifications, 
ONEM2M, http://www.onem2m.org/technical/published-documents (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2015). 
99 See e.g., MSIT in Privacy Engineering, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, 
http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/ (introducing Carnegie Mellon’s Master of Science in 
Information Technology – Privacy Engineering program). 
100 Cliff Ortmeyer, IoT Privacy: Engineering Fault, Not User Issue, EBN 
 (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.ebnonline.com/author.asp?section_id=3507&doc 
_id=277329&page_number=1 (“Between the development of IoT standards, the 
selection of wireless technologies, and the adoption of an appropriate Internet 
Protocol, most engineers are still wrapped up in the basic infrastructure of IoT. 
As a result, more abstract ideas such as personal privacy can quickly fall by the 
wayside.”). 
101 See Microsoft, Quick Tutorials, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube. 
com/playlist?list=PLtSVUgxIo6KoI5ogCBZuAjB6HprjiaKNM (last updated 
Feb. 6, 2015). 
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B. Personal Protection and Decision-Making 
 Individual activities and precautions may be the final frontier for 
home network security. Developers can implement privacy and security 
by design. Companies can offer privacy-protective products and services.  
Ultimately, the future of privacy and security will depend on consumers 
paying attention to and paying for privacy. Consumers will learn to pay 
more for products where privacy protections will have been incorporated 
into their products by design. On their end, consumers must look beyond 
password entry. The security levels of network password protocols have 
been covered at length, and are beyond the scope of this article. In this 
article, a home-based solution is explained. 
 Generally, home monitoring devices are on the lax end of the 
security spectrum vis-à-vis commercially-networked devices, as the latter 
can rely on platform-based security solutions. This lack of baked-in 
security and privacy controls leaves consumers, by default, in charge of 
their own security. Consumers are not helpless to defend themselves 
against privacy intrusions, but they must take action.  
 Consumers can input effective password protection, if the feature 
is available on the home monitoring device. If they have password 
thresholds at all, then there is a need to notify or even require customers 
to re-set default passwords.  For newer devices, consumers may be able 
to use biometric or other alternatives to passwords, such as encryption 
for uploaded video feeds102 and other protection of data in transit to ramp 
up privacy protections. 
 Consumers can limit the amount of data entered into the device, 
a sort of data minimization on the ground level. Also, consumers can 
take action to delete their data on any given system, assuming it has not 
been shared pursuant to the consent or other exceptions listed on the 
privacy policy for that device.103 Indeed, consumers of IoT equipment 
                                                
102 Klint Finley, Stalk Yourself at Home with this Free App, WIRED (Mar. 16, 
2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/app-lets-stalk-home/ (“It’s 
hard not to worry about uploading video footage from your house to the cloud, 
but Maslan says that all the video is encrypted so that not even Camio’s 
engineers can access it (though it’s not possible to verify this without auditing 
Camio’s servers). For people uploading video that’s not particularly sensitive –
such as publicly viewable areas such as their front yards — this might not be a 
big deal. Everyone else will need to take a leap of faith.”). 
103 Nest Privacy Statement, supra note 20 (“You can delete the information on 
the Nest device by resetting it to the defaults (using Reset in the Settings menu). 
You can access, amend or delete your personal information from Nest’s servers 
through the controls in your account. Because of the way we maintain certain 
Services, after your information is deleted, backup copies may linger for some 
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can interconnect their devices to a secure platform, or at least a secure 
home network.104 Even these simple steps, however, may be onerous for 
the oldest users, and baked-in privacy by design and security by design 
are superior offerings. 
 There may be technical solutions that can be implemented on the 
home network level by individual consumers. This could be done 
through add-on products that protect a set of home monitoring devices as 
a wider system.105 At least one company offers such a service.106 Such 
platforms that manage home security and monitoring systems are 
proliferating, offering users additional choices to make simpler choices 
in the future with regard to privacy notices. Privacy controls could be 
done once for the platform rather than for each standalone device. 
Ideally, privacy notices will offer users a choice to revoke or revise their 
privacy level elections as their understanding or situation changes. 
 The most significant downside to platform-based home 
monitoring controls is that the platform, which houses all the aggregated 
data, provides a single point of entry for hackers. Even if that point is 
more secure than each of the standalone devices, hackers may still be 
successful. Also, there are limitations on a platform-level security 
barrier, including the ability of applications to collect data outside 
                                                                                                         
time before they are deleted, and we may retain certain data for a longer period 
of time if we are required to do so for legal reasons.”). 
104 See How to Secure Your Wireless Home Network, WIKIHOW, 
http://www.wikihow.com/Secure-Your-Wireless-Home-Network (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2015) (Noting that simple instructions are available online for making a 
home network more secure.). 
105 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 216–17, ll. 12–25, 1 (“Something that I 
would like to see exist is something I put on my home network before my cable 
router, DSL modem, or whatever, that allows me, in bulk, to anoint certain kinds 
of data that flows forth from my house. So that's a way of sort of aggregating 
consent-like stuff. It sounds a lot like DuoTrack, it sounds like other things like 
ad identifiers and things like that. And you would need some basic standard so 
that telehealth companies that do anything related to the Internet of Things could 
mark certain packets as, here's the thing, here's what it is trying to do, so that 
you could then preclude certain data from flowing forward. It's not a perfect 
solution, but it might help.” (quoting Joseph Lorenzo Hall of CDT)). 
106 Bitdefender BOX, BITDEFENDER, http://www.bitdefender.com/box/ (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2015) (“Advanced Threat Protection: Not just for your 
computers. Everything. Once connected to the Internet, every device, even 
Smart TVs, smart appliances like fridges, thermostats or gaming consoles are 
vulnerable to malware that silently does its work. BOX protects everything else 
that’s in the home: PCs, Macs, Android and iOS tablets and phones alike. Just 
like an antivirus for your home network.”). 
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platform parameters and the need to pre-identify known threats.107 Data 
anonymization, meaning masking the personally-identifying aspects of 
data, has some utility but in reality it reduces functionality when the 
purpose of this data is to identify, locate, and potentially save the life of 
an individual user. Data minimization is an underutilized technique. 
Applying “just in time” saving strategies from manufacturing to data 
privacy principles would result in a “just enough data” to do the job. 
Data beyond the requisite amount needed for functionality should not be 
collected, analyzed, and/or stored. 
C. Expansion of Existing Regulations to Cover Data Gathered by 
Home Monitoring Devices 
 HIPAA provides a model to evaluate future regulation of home 
monitoring in some cases. HIPAA regulation was expanded in 2013 to 
include the Business Associate (BA) agreement requirement, aiming to 
encompass business associates who contract with covered entities.108 In 
the transcript of the FTC workshop on IoT, Lee Tien of EFF noted that, 
for a California proposal, “[w]e also use rules that are modeled after 
HIPAA business associate type rules, so that downstream recipients of 
data shared from the utilities are bound in a similar way.”109 
 HIPAA could be expanded again to include under its regulatory 
umbrella any business that captures, processes, and stores health data. 
Under this scenario, medically significant, extremely private data will 
have some protection. Just as HIPAA was expanded in 2013 in response 
to concerns about new technology for accessing data via additional 
systems, it could be expanded incrementally over the next few years to 
encompass personal health data emanating from home monitoring 
devices collecting information. 
                                                
107 Molly Wood, CES: Security Risks from the Smart Home, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/technology/personaltech/ces-
security-risks-from-the-smart-home.html?mwrsm=Email&_r=1 (“But as with 
most antivirus and anti-malware products, the box can scan for and detect only 
code that has already been identified as a threat. Something new could still 
sneak through. And the box can’t do anything about the personal data harvested 
by all the various apps that control smart devices in the home or outside of it.”). 
108 The HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules regulated health care providers, 
health plans and companies that process health insurance claims.  Revisions to 
the original rules added business associates of these companies that have access 
to protected health information, including the covered entities’ contractors and 
subcontractors. http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredent 
ities/businessassociates.html. 
109 IOT WORKSHOP, supra note 2, at 70, ll. 4–7. 
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 The expansion of HIPAA still leaves the routine data of climate, 
location, and home occupant data unprotected. To that end, the staff of 
the FTC would like Congress to go beyond mere security breach 
notifications, which they believe would better protect the security of data 
and thereby allow health care monitoring and support devices to function 
properly.110  
 Pending federal bills would create a coherent scheme for 
protecting data and establishing breach notifications. For example a 
proposal from the White House suggests that covered entities for privacy 
protections be expanded to cover any “person that collects, creates, 
processes, retains, uses, or discloses personal data in or affecting 
interstate commerce,”111 a much broader standard that could include 
home monitoring devices and platforms. Enforcement capabilities under 
the White House proposal would rest with the FTC under its traditional 
authority to protect consumers.112 The bills reflect a trend towards 
broader responsibility for data collection, processing, and storage. This 
would address the current issue of possible home monitoring privacy 
legislation being too specific. Even IoT privacy legislation may be too 
specific to gain broad-based political support.113 
CONCLUSION 
 Now is the time to evaluate potential home monitoring 
regulation and its alternatives. But while we wait for pending 
developments at the federal level on consumer privacy and data security, 
consumers can make market choices and personal choices with their data 
that serves to protect them. At this point, consumers have begun to weigh 
the options presented to them in the world of IoT, and its entry into their 
homes. They should continue to make informed choices about their 
privacy before a breach occurs. To begin, some people might opt out of 
using home monitoring devices. These individuals might prefer to incur 
                                                
110 IOT CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 4, at vii–viii (“General data security 
legislation should protect against unauthorized access to both personal 
information and device functionality itself. For example, if a pacemaker is not 
properly secured, the concern is not merely that health information could be 
compromised, but also that a person wearing it could be seriously harmed.”). 
111 WHITE HOUSE DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT, supra note 
44, at 1. 
112 Id. (“A violation of Title I of this Act shall be treated as an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45).”).  
113 Id. at vii (“IoT-specific legislation at this stage would be premature. Staff 
also agrees that development of self-regulatory programs designed for particular 
industries would be helpful as a means to encourage the adoption of privacy- 
and security-sensitive practices.”). 
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the more expensive cost of human care and monitoring. Some others may 
choose less invasive devices that gather information but do not transmit 
the information to the Internet.114 Others still may use commercially-
available or home-grown privacy protection devices that layer security 
and privacy on top of home monitoring devices. 
 This is a transitional moment in the adoption timeline of home 
monitoring technologies. In order to decide how much security and 
privacy these devices need, we have to decide as a society where home 
monitoring devices fit on the scale of importance, from equivalent to 
national security or to the lesser standard of disposable and recreational 
gadgets.  TRUSTe, an online privacy management service, noted that 
22% of consumers believe that the benefits of IoT devices outweigh the 
risks to privacy.115 At this point, it is safe to assume that these devices 
will be a part of home life for many of us. We must therefore act 
accordingly to secure home monitoring systems from hacking and 
unauthorized data collection. 
                                                
114 The author of this paper has a non-IoT pedometer. Occasionally, the author 
wears it. 
115 TRUSTe Privacy Index: 2014 Internet of Things Edition, TRUSTE (2014), 
http://www.truste.com/resources/privacy-research/us-Internet-of-things-index-
2014/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2015). 
